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CANADIAN LEGAL AND POLICY MEASURES THAT COULD BE USED TO
RESPOND TO A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES
Gloria Mintah & Carolyn Inch*
1. INTRODUCTION
This article arose out of a bioterrorism conference organized by
Case Western Reserve School of Law on March 31, 2006. The hypothetical
scenario developed by the law school is that terrorists had infected cattle
with foot and mouth disease through an animal feed (FMD) on a farm in the
state of Ohio. Before the diagnosis of the disease, relatives from the farm in
Ohio travelled to the farm of their relatives in Southern Ontario, Canada,
arriving in clothing and shoes that may have served as transport for the dis-
ease into Canada. This article explores Canada's possible response to the
hypothetical outbreak of the disease in the United States.
In Canada, activities to control and eradicate animal diseases are
within the mandate of the Government of Canada under the Health of Ani-
mals Act (Act).' The Act addresses diseases that may affect animals or that
may be transmitted by animals to persons. It also aims to protect animals
from disease. While the Act gives power to the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency (CFIA) to regulate diseases and toxic substances in all species of
animals in Canada, in policy the CFIA has restricted its mandate to food
producing animals, in most cases. The mandate is further defined by listing
certain diseases as reportable 2 or immediately notifiable under the Health of
Animals Regulations. These diseases are generally serious foreign animal
diseases, such as FMD, many of which are zoonotic and are the subject of
eradication programs such as Bovine Brucellosis or Tuberculosis.
. Gloria Mintah, M.A. (Cantab); LL.M, Senior Counsel, Department of Justice, Legal
Services, Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Carolyn Inch, DVM, National Manager, Dis-
ease Control, Animal Health Division, Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The views ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the authors. They do not represent or reflect the views of
the Government of Canada, the Department of Justice Canada, or the Canadian Food Inspec-
tion Agency. These views do not in any way dictate what actions the Government of Canada
and/or the Canadian Food Inspection Agency would actually take in the event of an outbreak
of FMD or any other disease internationally.
1 Health of Animals Act, 1990 S.C., c. 21 (Can.).
2 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is prescribed as a reportable disease in the Reportable
Diseases Regulations (Health of Animals Act) SOR/91-2 (Can.).
3 Health of Animals Regulations SOR/91-25, s. 2 (Can.).
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The CFIA, established as a body corporate by the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency Act (CFIA Act),4 administers and enforces the Act.5 The
CFIA is headed by a president who, as the chief executive officer of the
CFIA, supervises and directs the agency's work and staff. The Minster of
Agriculture and Agri-Food, Canada, is the Minister responsible for the
CFIA.6 All the powers of the Minister under the Health of Animals Act,
except for the declaration of a control area, may be performed by CFIA
inspectors or officers.
The Government of Canada has concurrent jurisdiction in control-
ling animal diseases with the provinces,7 many of which have legislation
equivalent to the Health of Animals Act. However, the federal mandate
takes precedence over the provincial mandate for listed diseases. The prov-
inces use their legislation to control diseases that the CFIA does not control.
Furthermore, the pieces of provincial legislation are not enforced at the bor-
der even though they may be used by the provinces after an imported animal
arrives at its destination and the animal does not meet provincial standards.
While the provincial legislation does not play a role in CFIA control pro-
grams, for the most part, provincial departments of agriculture assist the
CFLA in controlling diseases that are present in the country and are difficult
to eradicate.
While the Act is the main piece of legislation under which FMD
control and eradication measures could be handled in Canada, since the
disease could also spread through animal feed, measures could also be taken
by the CFIA pursuant to the Feeds Act 8 to ban the importation of the con-
taminated feed from the United States into Canada. However, it must be
noted that the Feeds Act cannot be used to control animal diseases.
II. TRADE IMPLICATIONS
Canada's economy is heavily reliant upon trade in animals and
animal by-products. This trade is not only between Canada and the United
States but also between Canada and its other trading partners, such as Japan.
It is, therefore, important for Canada to maintain the high standard and
reputation it has built with its trading partners. The essence of this was cap-
tured as one of the two objectives of Bill C-66, which later became the
4 Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act, 1997 S.C., c. 6 (Can.).
5 Id. § 11(1). The CFIA also administers and enforces the Feeds Act. Id.
6 Id.§4.
7 Constitution Act, 1867, 30, 31 Vict. Ch. 3 § 95 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985).
8 Feeds Act, R.S.C., c. F-9 (1985) (Can.). The actions that may be taken under the Feeds
Act are beyond the scope of this article since adequate actions can be taken against the feed,
as a thing, under the Health of Animals Act.
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Health of Animals Act. On the introduction of the Bill, the Parliamentary
Secretary, on behalf of the Minister of Agriculture, said, "[The Act] . . .
must ensure that Canadian products continue their international reputation
for high standards."
With the importance and magnitude of the economic benefits of
trade in mind, it is most likely that one of the first actions that Canada
would take in the event of a presumptive or confirmed outbreak of FMD in
the United States would be to halt trade in susceptible animals, animal
products, and, if appropriate, animal feed between Canada and the United
States. FMD can affect cattle, sheep, and pigs, as well as deer and other
cloven hoofed animals. The scope and duration of such actions would fully
consider the science based international standards of the Foot and Mouth
disease Chapter of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organi-
zation for Animal Health (OIE) and respect Canada's obligations under the
Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organi-
zation. Actions would also be predicated on any pre-existing Memorandum
of Understanding established to govern such a response within the terms,
conditions and spirit of the Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS) provisions of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The statutory scheme for the importation of animals is set out in the
Health of Animals Regulations.9 Specifically, one can import cattle, sheep,
or pigs, the species of concern for FMD, from the United States into Canada
without a permit if they are accompanied by a certificate.' 0 In the event of
an outbreak of FMD in the United States, the Minister would put in place a
Ministerial import prohibition regulation to control the importation
of animal products and live animals for such periods as the Minister consid-
ers necessary." The effect of this would be to shut the Canadian border and
place a total ban on the importation into Canada of the animals and their
products pending an assessment of the outbreak and effectiveness of meas-
ures established in the United States. It is conceivable that initially, such a
prohibition would affect all of the susceptible animals in the entire United
States entering any part of Canada. As the situation unfolds further and the
extent of the infestation in the United States is known, the measure could be
scaled back.
With respect to countries other than the United States, if there were
a reason for a high level of suspicion that FMD existed in any country ex-
porting to Canada, it is within CFIA's legislated mandate to ban the flow of
animals and products into Canada by cancelling or suspending the issuance
of permits to import susceptible animals into Canada, if there is a belief that
9 Health of Animals Regulations, supra note 4 §§ 10-16.
l0 Id. § 12(2).
11 Health of Animals Act, 1990 S.C., ch. 21 § 14.
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failure to do so could result in the introduction of the disease into the coun-
try.
12
In addition, there are provisions in the Health of Animals Act under
which an inspector can act to prevent the entry of animals suspected of be-
ing or being infected with a disease. 3 The Act imposes an obligation on a
person who imports into Canada any animal, animal feed, or any other po-
tentially harmful carrier of the disease to present the animal or thing, either
before or at the time of importation, to an officer or inspector for inspection
by the office or the inspector. The officer or inspector may detain the animal
or the thing until it has been inspected. If the animal or thing is not declared
or it was imported illegally, it shall be forfeited to the government and may
be destroyed. In this circumstance, the importer would not be allowed to
remove the animal from Canada, an option which, in lieu of forfeiture, is
available if the animal is declared but is found not to meet the requirements
of the Act or the Regulations.
Given the potentially serious impact of a border closure, Canada,
the U.S., and Mexico have developed a communications strategy that in-
cludes trade actions expected in the event of FMD in one of the countries.
This strategy is outlined in the section on communications.
III. DOMESTIC CONTROL AND ERADICATION MEASURES
A. Suspicion of the Disease in the United States
As the CFIA deals with the trade issue and tries to prevent the dis-
ease from entering Canada, it will simultaneously take domestic measures to
prevent it from spreading if there is a suspicion that the disease has already
been transmitted to the country. As soon as Canada becomes aware that
there is an FMD outbreak in the United States and that it might have been
carried to Canada by travellers from the United States, CFIA inspectors or
officers may, for the purpose of detecting diseases, "at any reasonable time,
enter and inspect any place or stop any conveyance, in which the inspector
or officer believes on reasonable grounds there is any animal or thing to
which the Act or the Health of Animals Regulations apply .... 14 With this
authority, the inspector may enter the farm or place where the travellers
from the United States visited. The inspector or officer may enter the prem-
ises without consent or a warrant unless it is a dwelling house, in which case
the consent of the occupant of the house or a warrant is a precondition for
entry. 15 The inspector or officer may, among other things, open any recep-
12 Health of Animals Regulations, supra note 4 § 160(3)(c).
13 Health of Animals Act §§ 16-18.
14 Id. § 38(1)(a).
1 Id. § 39(1).
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tacle or cage, examine any animal or thing, and require any person to pro-
duce any record or document for inspection and copying.16 In addition to
these actions, the inspector or officer may "require any person to present
any animal or thing for inspection in such a manner and under such circum-
stances as the inspector or officer considers necessary to carry out the in-
spection ... The inspector may also "conduct any tests or analyses or
take any measurements."'' 8 The Act also places an obligation on an owner or
person with the possession, care, and control of an animal or of any other
thing that is capable of being affected or contaminated with a disease to
supply a sample in a prescribed manner.' 9 While no regulations have been
made to prescribe the manner in which samples may be submitted, it is ar-
guable that such regulations may not be necessary since an inspector would
likely use the authority under paragraph 38(1)(d) of the Act to collect sam-
ples.
The exercise of the powers under paragraphs 38(1)(b), (d), and (e)
is limited by a reasonable belief on the part of the inspector or officer that
the Act or regulations apply to the animal or thing in respect of which the
action is being taken. However, one does not see the same limitations in
respect of the powers under paragraph 38(l)(c). One may be inclined to
argue that an inspector or officer may require any animal to be presented,
whether or not the animal is susceptible to FMD, whether it is found in the
place of entry, or whether or not the animal has been in contact with another
animal suspected of having the disease. It would also appear that an entry
on premises is not even necessary; the inspector may request the animal to
be presented at any place. This seems to be a very broad power and it is not
clear, should this be challenged in court, to which extent the court would
curtail this power. Also, the CFIA may, by itself decide, by policy, not to
wield such a broad authority as seems to have been conferred under para-
graph 38(l)(c).
The policy instruments that would guide activity within CFIA dur-
ing this time are emergency response plans. An emergency is defined as an
event that requires the mobilization of resources beyond those that are re-
quired to discharge responsibilities under normal circumstances. The
CFIA's "Emergency Response Plan" outlines the general conditions for an
emergency and defines the roles and responsibilities in the event of an ani-
mal, plant, feed, or food related emergency. In the circumstances of a sus-
pected foreign animal disease in Canada or the United States with possible
links to Canada, the emergency respondents would be guided in their ac-
16 Id. §§ 38(1)(b), (d)-(e).
17 Id. § 38(1)(c).
18 Health of Animals Act, § 38(1)(f).
19 Id. § 6(2).
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tions by two additional documents. The "Animal Health Functional Plan"
outlines the roles and responsibilities at the national, area, regional, and
field level and is developed using an Incident Command Structure. This is a
widely recognized command and control structure for emergency response
and provides clear lines of responsibility. Science-based policy decisions
that are disease specific are contained in the various hazard specific plans,
in this case the "Foot and Mouth Disease Hazard Specific Plan". This
document outlines the actions related to aspects of premises investigation,
control, testing and tracing in the event of an FMD outbreak.
B. Infected Place and Quarantine
As soon as an inspector or an officer suspects or determines that
FMD exists in Canada and forms an opinion that the disease could spread or
that animals or things entering that place could become affected, the inspec-
tor may, in writing, declare that place to be an infected place. "When the
declaration is delivered to the occupier or the owner of the place to which it
relates," that place and all contiguous lands, building and other place occu-
pied or owned by the owner would constitute an infected place.20 In order to
prevent the further spread of the disease, the inspector or officer may also
declare as infected all farms within five kilometres of the first infected
place. Presumably, the farms that might be declared infected within the five
kilometres would be those that have susceptible animals. In both instances,
the declaration will identify the disease.21 A declaration of an infected place
may be lifted when the inspector or officer declares that the disease in the
declaration does not exist in the place, will not spread from the place, or the
disease is not injurious to the health of persons or animals.
While a declaration of an infected place is effectively a quarantine
of a place, it is possible to quarantine only an animal or a thing without im-
posing a quarantine on the place as a whole. This authority is exercised
where an inspector finds or suspects that any animal or thing is a disease
agent, an animal or thing is affected by or contaminated with a communica-
ble disease (defined as an infectious or contagious disease), or any record or
document required to be produced by or under the Act or the Health of
Animals Regulations is not produced.22
When a place is declared an infected place or an animal is quaran-
tined at a place, movement restrictions come into place. With the former,
subject to any regulations, there is a prohibition against removing or taking
into the infected place any animal or thing without a licence issued by an
20 Id. § 22(2).
21 Id. § 23.
22 Health of Animals Regulations, supra note 4 § 6; see also id. § 9 (providing similar
provisions for the quarantine of imported animals).
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inspector or officer, and where the inspector or officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that a thing or animal has been removed from or taken to
the place, they may order its return to or removal from the place23 With re-
spect to the latter, as soon as the quarantine is ordered and a notice thereof
is served by personal delivery on the owner or person who has possession,
care, or control of the quarantined article or animal, the animal or thing may
not be removed from the place of quarantine, may not be allowed to come
into contact with the an animal or thing that is not quarantined under the
same order, and may not be destroyed, treated or tested for a communicable
disease without the consent of an inspector. The inspector who issued the
quarantine "may specify the manner, condition, place or places and time of
quarantine .... ,,24
One may ask why a declaration of an infected place or a quarantine
order, not to mention some import measures can be made only on suspicion
which, by definition, is "[t]he apprehension or imagination of the existence
of something wrong based only on inconclusive or slight evidence, or pos-
sibly even no evidence.,, 25 The courts have also recognized that suspicion
sets a relatively low standard that only requires the presence of certain indi-
cia on which the inspector bases his decision, and not a reasonable belief or
a firm belief in the existence of a communicable disease.26 It is possible that
the law makers saw these measures as immediate and temporary to stop the
spread of the disease and its devastating impact as the authorities conduct
more investigations. Also, it is possible that these actions would be taken in
extreme measures or in respect of catastrophic diseases. This rationale
would seem to be supported by statements made at the introduction of the
Act. In answering a question by a Parliamentarian during Parliamentary
Committee hearings, a technical advisor, then of the Department of Agricul-
ture and Agri-Food, Canada said, in respect of the extension of the five
kilometres zone in the event of a declaration of an infected place:
An inspector has the right to increase the quarantine from the original farm
to all the surrounding farms as an initial thing instantly, and it would only
be used in the event of a foreign animal disease like foot and mouth. Basi-
cally, at that point in time, that only allows control of the movement of
animals ... that would spread disease .... [T]he five kilometre area ... is
basically a quarantine of the farms in that area and a temporary measure
normally.
23 Health of Animals Act, § 25(1)-(2).
24 Health of Animals Regulations, supra note 4 § 91.4(1).
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004).
26 E.g., Wadarcerf International Inc. v. R, No. T-2990-92, (Fed. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000), 2000
Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 1495, at 7-8. 199 F.T.R. 161, [2000] F.J.C. No. 517 (Trial Div.), ap-
peal allowed on other grounds, [2001] F.C.J. 1918 (Fed. C.A.).
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It is also clear that the impact on trade of any foreign animal dis-
ease, as well as the need to maintain Canada's international reputation for
high standards, is another reason why the standard has been set so low.
Whatever the rationale may be, it is our belief that the function can-
not be discharged on flimsy grounds, capriciously or without any credible
basis. Indeed, Wadarcerf International Inc. established that there should be
certain indicia upon which actions might be taken.
C. Control Area
While the authority to declare an infected place or order a quaran-
tine of an animal or thing can be made on suspicion (as well as on the exis-
tence of a disease), certain measures can be taken only on the existence of,
or on belief, that a disease exists. The Minister cannot delegate the authority
to declare a control area and must do it himself or herself.27 One of these
measures is the Minister's discretion to declare an area to be a control area,
describe the area and identify the disease when they believe that a disease
exists in an area.28 While the statutory threshold for the exercise of this au-
thority, being a "reasonable belief," is higher than a "suspicion" of a dis-
ease, but still lower than absolute certainty,29 the declaration of a control
area would be based upon laboratory results confirming that transmission
has occurred and the FMD virus is in Canada.
The control area can be any size and can even cover a whole prov-
ince or two provinces if marketing patterns would indicate that a disease
would have been spread between the provinces in the normal course of
commerce. This is how the technical advisor appearing before the Parlia-
mentary Committee hearings captured the essence of the size of the control
area stating, "This is a 'biggy' where in essence some kind of a disaster has
happened. A foot and mouth outbreak is a normal one.... It is where you
want to control a large area."
The size will take into account several factors such as the presumed
rate of spread, the husbandry and marketing practices, and the length of
time the disease has been in the country. The principle of control area dec-
laration is that the largest area likely to be infected is declared to contain the
disease. Factors such as having provisions for feeding, slaughtering, market-
ing and consuming product within the control area are also taken into ac-
27 Health of Animals Act §§ 27, 33.
28 Id. § 27(1).
29 See Cervinus Inc. v. Canada, No. A-34-01, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) (Fed Ct. Oct. 22, 2002),
available at 2002 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 6959, at 20. [2002] F.J.C. No. 1461, (2002), F.C.A.
398, reversing [2006] F.J.C. 2116 (Trial Division). Application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court dismissed [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 537.
[Vol. 38:589
LEGAL AND POLICY MEASURES
count as it is very difficult to remove product from the control area, except
under permits and licences issued by CFIA inspectors.3°
After declaring a control area, the Minister may take all reasonable
steps, consistent with public safety, to remedy any dangerous condition or
mitigate any danger to life, health, property, or the environment that results
or may result from the existence of the disease. The Minister may also make
regulations prohibiting or regulating movement of persons, things, or ani-
mals, including conveyances from the control area, create zones and author-
ize the disposal or treatment of animals and things that might have been in a
control area.31 While the authority to establish zones within the control area
has not been entrenched in regulation as required by the Act, in practice the
CFIA creates infected and restricted zones within the control area.
We believe that the reasonable measures that the Minister may take
pursuant to subsection 27(2) of the Act, on the declaration of a control area,
may be done administratively. However, given that the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms 32 (the Charter), which guarantees not only mobility
rights,33 but also the right to liberty and security of the person,34 any restric-
tions on the movement of persons cannot be so made and having it done by
regulations respects the principles of the Charter.
D. Notice Forbidding Entry
Where a disease exists that is capable of affecting animals, reason-
able steps have been taken by the Minister to bring the disease to the atten-
tion of the person having care and control of animals in the area and make
those persons aware of the law. Every person who owns or has care and
control of an animal in the area is required by law to affix a notice forbid-
ding entry to the entrance where the animal is kept, and unless a person has
a right of entry, there is a prohibition against entry to the place without the
authority of a CFIA officer or inspector.
35
There are two conditions for the exercise of this power: there must
be an existence of a disease and the minister must have taken reasonable
steps to bring the existence of the disease to the attention of the people in
the area. Thus, until there is a confirmation of an outbreak of a disease, this
provision cannot be invoked. As for notifying people about the disease, it
would not be not necessary for the CFIA to issue individual notices, it can
30 See Health of Animals Regulations, supra note 4 §§ 80, 161.
31 Health of Animals Act § 27(2)-(3).
32 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
33 Id. § 6.
34 Id.§7.
35 Health of Animals Act § 7.
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do so by television or other media releases or mail out or any other reason-
able means.
This is what was said during the Parliamentary Committee hearings
as to when this authority would normally be invoked:
This would be used, for instance, in the case of a foot and mouth disease
outbreak to control people who are going up and down the road--dg
salesmen, people like that - people who are going into each barn and might
inadvertently carry manure and thus the disease from place to place....
This would be done in a smaller area where the risk was higher. But both
would basically be foreseen in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth
or some rapidly spreading and serious disease.
This excerpt seems to identify the target of the notice; it was not meant to
restrict the movement of the farmer and anyone with right of entry, for ex-
ample, his/her family and presumably, his/her employees.
E. Disposal and Treatment
Whether or not there is proof that the outbreak of FMD in the
United States has spread to Canada, the Minister may dispose of or treat any
animal or thing or require its owner to dispose of it or treat it if the animal
or thing is, or is suspected of being affected or contaminated by disease; has
been in close proximity to an animal or thing that was or is suspected of
having been affected or contaminated by a disease, or is suspected of being
a vector.36
The order to dispose of an animal or thing usually comes in the
form of a destruction order. On infected premises, infected and exposed
animals would be ordered destroyed. It is possible to order destruction
based on clinical signs in advance or receiving a laboratory confirmation as
FMD virus is highly contagious and the continued presence of animals pro-
ducing virus is likely to spread disease. It is also within the Animal Health
Functional Plan to pre-emptively slaughter animals on premises that have
not shown sign of disease if there is a direct epidemiological link to an in-
fected farm.
The disposal of the destroyed animals is at the discretion of an in-
spector, exercising the delegated authority of the Minister. By policy, the
CFIA would require the owner to dispose of the animals under the direction
of the CFIA and where the owner would not carry out the disposal, the
CFIA would do it. The CFIA would first attempt to have the animals dis-
posed of or would do so on the farm by burial, or if the animals were small,
composting in order to minimize the risk of transmission of disease by mov-
ing carcasses off of the farm. The method of disposal would be in accor-
36 Id. § 48.
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dance with environmental requirements of the province where the farm is
situated.
F. Compensation
The Minister may order compensation to be paid for all animals or-
dered destroyed. Compensation for a destroyed animal could include costs
related to the disposal of the animal as are permitted by regulations.37
Compensation may also be paid for a thing that is ordered de-
stroyed,38 as well as by regulations, the cost related to its disposal.39 In addi-
tion, compensation may be paid for the treatment of an animal or a thing.4
There are also provisions governing the withholding or forfeiture of com-
pensation in the event of a violation or an offence under or a contravention
of the Act.
4 1
The amount of compensation for a destroyed animal is the fair mar-
ket value,42 "as determined by the Minister, that the animal would have at
the time of its evaluation by the Minister if it had not been required to be
destroyed minus the value of the carcass, as determined by the Minister" up
to a maximum amount prescribed by regulations.4 3 The Compensation for
Destroyed Animals Regulations prescribes the maximum amounts for listed
animals. 44 If a destroyed animal is not listed, there is a default amount estab-
lished in the Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations. 45 The com-
pensation amount for a thing ordered destroyed is the fair market value, less
any amount received for it, up to a prescribed maximum amount.No regula-
tions have been made to cap the maximums for destroyed things.
"Fair market value" has been defined by the courts as "the highest
price available in an open market between informed and prudent parties,
acting at arm's length and under no compulsion to act, expressed in terms of
cash. Lost net income and costs resulting from the interruption in the pro-
duction line are not elements of 'fair market value."'
37 Id. § 51.
38 Id.§ 52.
39 Id. § 55(c); see also Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations, SOR/2000-233
(Can.).
40 Health of Animals Act § 53.
41 Id.§54.
42 See id. § 55(a) (allowing the Minister to make regulations "respecting the method of
calculating market value of animals for which the Minister considers there is no readily
available market... .
43 Id. § 51(2)-(3).
44 SOR/2000-233 § 2.
41 Id. § 2(b).
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A person who is dissatisfied with the amount of compensation may
appeal to an assessor, within 3 months after the claimant receives notifica-
tion of the disposition of the claim.46 The assessor may extend the time for
appeal.47 Grounds for the appeal are that the amount awarded is unreason-
able or that the refusal to award is unreasonable. 48 The decision of the asses-
sor is final.49
IV. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
There cannot be an effective disease control and eradication without
provision of information from the Government of Canada to the Canadian
public, including industry, between the Canadian Government and Govern-
ments of the Provinces, and an exchange of information between the Gov-
ernment of Canada and the Government of the United States. In Canada, the
disclosure of information is based on the principle that Canadian citizens
and permanent residents have a right of access to information under the
control of a government institution (defined as "any department or ministry
of state of the Government of Canada" as listed in a schedule to the Access
to Information Act).46 The CFIA is listed in the schedule.
However, there are exemptions, which allow the head of a govern-
ment institution to hold back certain information. For example, the head of a
government institution cannot disclose a third party's confidential informa-
tion, information that may prejudice the competitive position of the third
party or information the disclosure of which may interfere with the contrac-
tual or other negotiations of the third party. The head of a government insti-
tution is also prohibited from disclosing personal information.5" Despite the
prohibitions, the head of institution may disclose third party information and
personal information with consent or if the disclosure would be in the public
interest. 51
A request for government information may also be made under
common law. This would be of benefit to those who are not Canadian citi-
zens or permanent residents of Canada and/or those who might not want to
hire a Canadian agent to make the request on their behalf.
When it comes to an exchange of information between the two gov-
ernments, it is unclear, at least, at the initial outbreak of the disease in the
United Sates, what information the United States Government would re-
46 Health of Animals Act § 56.
47 Id. § 56(2).
41 ld. § 56(1).
49 Access to Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-I §§ 3-4 (1985) (Can.).
50 Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21 § 8 (1993) (Can.). The Privacy Act also defines "personal
information." Id. § 3.
51 Access to Information Act § 20(6); see also Privacy Act § 2.
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quire from the Canadian Government, or conversely, what information the
latter can or should provide to the former. Rather, the flow of information
would need to come from the United States. For example, the Government
of Canada might need information about shipment of products from the
affected areas to Canada as well as information about the travellers from the
infected farm in the United States and, where in Southern Ontario they vis-
ited and whether or not they were still in Canada. As investigations into the
disease progress in Canada, the Canadian government would be expected to
advise the Government of the United States about the status of these inves-
tigations.
The United States law that would allow information to be disclosed
to Canada is outside the scope of this paper. However, under Canadian law
some information could be disclosed, if, among other grounds, the disclo-
sure would be in the public interest or if the two governments have signed
an information-sharing agreement or a memorandum of understanding.
It would appear that there is no such bilateral agreement or memo-
randum of understanding between the Governments of Canada and the
United States for the sharing of information on FMD. However, there is a
tripartite agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, related
to the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank
(NAFMDVB). This agreement is based on the 1982 NAFMDVB MOU
between the three countries; World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)
Terrestrial Animal Health Code; and September 2003 European Union (EU)
Council Directives 2003/85/EC on Community measures for the control of
foot-and-mouth disease. The NAFMDVB, mandated under the North
American Free Trade Agreement between the three countries, is organized
under the North American Animal Health Committee, a group comprised of
the countries' Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs). An updated version of the
1982 NAFMDVB MOU is in being negotiated between the three countries
While the primary focus of the Bank is the provision of FMD vac-
cine in the face of an incursion in any of the three countries, the Committee
has also elaborated details of the proposed response in a document entitled
The North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB)
Program, February 2004. Chapter 12 of the document, dealing with Out-
break Communications, states:
Communication between the presumptive positive and the confirmed diag-
nosis is restricted to confidential internal risk. The following sequence of
events may be anticipated:
(1) The CVO of the infected country would initiate communication with
his/her domestic government officials and per national communication
plan.
(2) The CVO of the infected country will notify the CVOs of the other two
tripartite countries of the presumptive diagnosis. At the discretion of the
CVO, this notification may be made even if all of the criteria of a pre-
sumptive diagnosis are not met.
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(3) There would be no communication with the OIE or the public until a
confirmation is obtained.
This policy document does not make reference to sharing information about
travelers, which is a crucial piece of information that Canada would need in
order to trace the Southern Ontario farm. Given that trading partners do
exchange information about potentially infected animals that have been
exported from a country that became aware of the presence of disease after
the exportation, it is anticipated that particulars about the travelers would be
provided by the United States to Canada to facilitate finding tracing the
potential incursion.
With respect to communication with industry and the provinces, the
CFIA would make a decision to inform them, based upon the information
that Canada would receive from the United States. This would be a neces-
sary first step if the farm location had not been conveyed by the United
States, potentially due to privacy constraints.
V. PARTNERS IN RESPONSE
There might be a brief period in which there is public suspicion that
FMD is communicable to humans. While it is unlikely that this fear would
translate into a response in Canada by the time of the FMD diagnosis, if
there were a period of uncertainty about the zoonotic potential of the dis-
ease, the CFIA would assume its role as outlined within the Non-Enteric
Zoonotic Disease Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that has recently
been drafted between the CFIA and the Public Health Agency of Canada,
Health Canada and other involved federal departments. This MOU estab-
lishes which federal department takes the lead in the event of a disease that
could be transmitted to humans.
As well, the "Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Support Plans"
would be activated in each province and would outline the roles and respon-
sibilities for response between the federal government and the provincial
government ministries of agriculture, emergency planning, health and the
municipal governments.
VI. CANADIAN POLICY AND RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Royal Ca-
nadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Public Safety and Emergency Prepar-
edness Canada (PSEPC) use an intelligence-led approach to prevent, detect,
and disrupt terrorist activities in Canada. PSEPC maintains Canada's Na-
tional Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) which outlines a coordinated policy
and operational response to terrorist incidents by government and law en-
forcement agencies. If it is suspected that an act of terrorism has taken place
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in Canada, the NCTP would be invoked and the RCMP would lead a crimi-
nal investigation into the incident. The CFIA would provide technical and
laboratory expertise in the areas of animal health and be responsible for
control and eradication of any animal or plant disease found in Canada, and
even if there was no direct attack on the Canadian agri-food system, CSIS,
and RCMP, with assistance from the CFIA, would increase the country's
level of readiness.
VII. CONCLUSION
The response to a foreign animal disease incursion in Canada
would, in effect, be the same as that in the United States in that regulatory
officials would isolate and contain the disease using similar techniques. The
primary difference in Canada is the pre-eminent role of the federal agricul-
ture agency, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and the Health of Ani-
mals Act. While provincial governments will be intimately involved in pro-
viding assistance, the responsibility and legislative authority for movement
restriction, destruction, and containment rest with the federal government.
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